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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Rule 3(a) and Rule 3(b), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, and also pursuant to the pour-over 
provisions of Rule 42, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Frampton filed a Motion for An Additional Award of 
Attorney Fees on Defendant, Perkin's Claim for Offsets dated 
April 30, 1993 (Record, 1309-1311), accompanied with a 
Memorandum in Support of the motion (Record, 1312-1319), and 
an Affidavit by David K. Smith, supporting the claim for the 
additional attorney fees requested (Record, 1320-1324). 
Interestingly, on June 7, 1993, the Court executed 
(although inadvertently) an Order Supplementing Attorney 
Fees and Costs, granting the request of Frampton (Record, 
1552-1555) and dated June 7, 1993; however, at a subsequent 
hearing on August 5, 1993, the Court reversed itself, and 
denied any additional attorney fees to Frampton on its 
defense of Perkin's claim for offsets. (Transcript, 5163, 
lines 1-25), (Record 1773) 
It was from that Ruling that Frampton filed his 
appeal on October 6, 1993. (Record, 1862-1865). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Inasmuch as the trial court refused to grant 
1 
Frampton addition attorney fees in successfully defending 
against Perkin's claim for negligent workmanship and 
subsequent water damage, (Record 1862-1865) such a 
determination is a question of law which should be reviewed 
by this court for correctness. State v. Larsen, (Utah App., 
1993), 228 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 3; State v. James, (Utah, 1991) 
819 P.2nd 781, 796; Ward v^ Richfield City, (Utah, 1990) 798 
P.2nd 757, 759. Accordingly, this Court should grant no 
particular deference to the trial court's conclusions. 
Schurtz v^ BMW of N^ AIL Inc., (Utah, 1991), 814 P.2nd 1108, 
1111-12. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The statutes which are considered determinative in 
this case involve the mechanic's lien statute at is existed 
at the time (Section 38-1-1, UCA, et. seq.), and in 
particular the section of the mechanic's lien statute 
pertaining to attorney fees. 
The section on attorney fees, Section 38-1-18, UCA, 
reads: 
"In any action brought to enforce any lien u 
this chapter the successful party shall be entitled 
recover a reasonable attorney's fee, to be fixed by 
court, which shall be taxed as costs in this action." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
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A. Nature of the Case: 
This case pertains to an appeal from the a lower 
court ruling denying Kent L. Frampton, dba Frampton Heating 
and Air Conditioning (hereafter "Frampton") additional 
attorney fees in defending against Zandra Perkin's 
(hereinafter "Perkins") ninth defense for offsets in her 
answer to Framptonfs Complaint for foreclosure of a 
mechanic's lien. (Record, 1862-1865) The offset was a 
claim for negligent workmanship against and resulting 
damages against Frampton's claim for monies still due for 
instalation of an air conditioning unit in Perkin's home. 
(Record, 388) 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition: 
Frampton initially filed his complaint in the Third 
Circuit Court for Salt Lake County, Murray Department on 
July 23, 1991, as Civil No. 913006938, seeking to (a) 
foreclose against a mechanic's lien filed by the Frampton 
for installation of a swamp cooler, (b) for judgment against 
the general contractor, First General Services (hereafter 
"First General") for breach of contract, and (c) for damages 
against Perkins for unjust enrichment. (Record 390-393) 
First General sought to have the case consolidated 
with a case it had previously filed on October 18, 1990, in 
the Third District Court (which bears the lower court number 
3 
in this appeal), against Zandra Perkins on. By stipulation, 
the motion was granted by the circuit court judge (Record, 
381) and the case was moved to the Third District Court and 
consolidated with the case now on appeal as of September 23, 
1991 (Record, 375). 
Shortly after transfer of the case to the Third 
District Court, Frampton filed a Notice of Readiness for 
trial on January 22, 1992 (Record, 408), however though 
several trial settings were subsequently set, discovery by 
the several parties prevented the case from going to trial 
until April 19, 1993, more than a year later. (Record 1236, 
1257) 
In the meantime, Frampton filed for a motion for 
summary judgment on September 23, 1992 (Record, 543), which 
was granted on January 28, 1993 against Perkins and First 
General Services on the mechanic's lien which had been filed 
by Frampton. The judgment was for $426.21 in monies still 
found to be owing Frampton, plus attorney fees of $4,557.00. 
(Record 1856 and 1858) 
At the hearing on Frampton's motion for summary 
judgment, the court found that (a) Frampton had a contract 
to install a swamp cooler with First General, (b) that the 
Frampton case was improperly transferred and consolidated 
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with the Third District Court Case by the Circuit Court on 
motion of First General, (c) that the Frampton installation 
of the swamp cooler was done in workmanlike manner, (d) that 
Frampton should be awarded attorney fees against the owner 
of the property, Perkins, and finally, (e) that Perkin's 
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation (sic.) 
against Frampton may continue and the amount of any judgment 
and attorney fees which the court granted on the motion for 
summary judgment were to be withheld pending trial of 
Perkin's claims for offset against Frampton. (Record 813) 
No appeal was taken from the Summary Judgment 
entered in this case. 
The case went to trial on April 19, 1993 and on the 
final day of trial, April 30, 1993, the court granted a 
written motion of Frampton, following submission of all 
testimony, for dismissal of Perkin's claims for offsets 
against Frampton. (Record, 1291) 
At the same time, Frampton filed a motion for 
additional attorney fees for having appear at a nearly two-
week jury trial, for cross-examination of defense 
witnesses, for presenting his own case in chief, and for 
submission of memoranda to dismiss on Perkin's claim for 
offsets. The amount sought was $9,464.42. (Record, 1309, 
5 
1320). 
Eventually, at a hearing on August 5, 1993, the 
court denied Frampton's motion for additional attorney fees. 
(Transcript 5163, lines 2-25) It is from this denial that 
Frampton appeals. 
C. Statement of Facts: 
1. Frampton filed a complaint in Third Circuit 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Murray 
Department, on July 23, 1991, seeking, among other things, 
to foreclose a mechanic's lien on certain property owned by 
Perkins. The case number given was 913006938. (Record, 
390) . 
2. Frampton was a subcontractor, who had been hired 
by the general contractor, First General, to install a swamp 
cooler on a home owned by Perkins following fire damage at 
the Perkin's home in Murray, Utah. (Record, 391) 
3. Frampton had been paid a portion of the contract 
amount by First General, but First General refused the pay 
the balance owing of $426.21, claiming that Perkins had 
refused to pay the balance due First General. (Record, 392) 
4. On the other hand, Perkins claimed that First 
General's work was substandard, and that First General and 
its subcontractors had been fired from the job, and hence 
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was due no more than had previously been advanced. (Record, 
388) 
5. As against Frampton, Perkins also claimed that 
Frampton's workmanship was also inferior, causing water 
damage to the property some months after the installation. 
They claimed that the resulting damage exceeded the amount 
due Frampton on it installation. (Transcript 4849, lines 9-
18) 
6. Although this was a small collection case, First 
General, after being served with the complaint, sought to 
have the case consolidated with a case it had filed in Third 
District Court on October 18, 1990 against Perkins for 
alleged breach of contract. First General was able to 
convince the circuit court and counsel for Frampton that the 
cases would be more efficiently resolved if tried together. 
An Order was thus entered transferring the cases to the 
Third District Court. (Transcript 4852, lines 1-3) 
7. Subsequent to that time, discovery was conducted 
by all parties, and as a result on September 23, 1992 
Frampton filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
mechanic's lien foreclosure action, also seeking attorney 
fees as provided by the mechanic's lien statutue. (Record, 
543) 
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8. The summary judgment was granted by hearing on 
January 14, 1993, and an ordered was entered on January 28, 
1993, granting Frampton monies due of $426.21, plus attorney 
fees of $4,557.00, and permitting Frampton to forelcosue on 
its mechanic's lien; however the judgment and foreclosure 
was ordered stayed until such time as a ruling was made on 
Perkin's claim for offsets. (Record 1856) 
9. Trial on the offset issue was heard with First 
General's case in chief, and Perkin's counterclaim. A two-
week jury trial was held from April 19, 1993 to April 30, 
1993 and at the conclusion of trial, the court granted 
Frampton's motion to dismiss as against Perkin's claim for 
offsets, but granted Frampton no attorney fees or costs for 
having to defend against this claim. (Record 1773) 
10. The record reflects, additionally, that the 
court attempted to encourage Perkins to resolve its claim 
with Frampton prior to trial, and during trial; however, 
Perkins remainded steadfast in its resolve of some 
entitlement to offset against the Frampton judgment, thus 
forcing Frampton to appear and defend at the jury trial. 
(Transcript 5163, lines 2-10) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Frampton claims he is entitled to an award of 
additional attorney fees for having to defend against 
Perkin's claim for offsets. Since collection on Frampton's 
summary judgment were specifically stayed by the court 
pending a full trial on Defendant's claim for offsets, 
attorney fees and costs incurred by Frampton are legitimate 
charges against the Defendant and reasonable fees should be 
awarded. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: DID THE TRIAL COURT 
JUDGE ERROR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
ANY ATTORNEY FEES OR COSTS TO 
FRAMPTON IN HIS SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE 
AGAINST PERKIN'S CLAIM FOR OFFSETS? 
The trial court judge ruled after nearly two weeks 
of trial, that Frampton was indeed entitled to a judgment of 
dismissal and/or for a directed verdict from Perkin's claims 
for negligent workmanship, and claims of approximately 
$13,000.00 for water damages which allegedly resulted. 
(Transcript, 4693, lines 1-3) 
Despite the successful defense, the trial court 
judge refused to allow any attorney fees or costs to 
Frampton for any of the preparation, or appearance at, or 
briefs prepared in connection with the defense of the 
9 
Perkin's claim for offsets. The court felt any fees, if 
awarded, were simply not reasonable, and the court also 
questioned whether the mechanic's lien statute was "broad" 
enough to cover a defending a tort action for negligent 
workmanship. (Transcript, 5163, lines 15-20) 
This notwithstanding, the court required Frampton to 
appear and defend on the claim for offsets, which was 
specifically reserved for resolution at trial, and 
Frampton's claim on its mechanic's lien was ordered by the 
court to be held in abeyance until a resolution of the 
offset claim. (Record, 813) Thus, no matter what, Frampton 
was unable to collect on its mechanic's lien judgment until 
the court ruled on Perkin's claim for offsets. 
One can certainly understand why the court felt that 
Frampton's claim had no business being in the much larger 
claims between Perkin's and First General Services, and Bear 
River. And it is certainly true that the trial court judge 
attempted several times to "encourage" counsel for Perkins 
to resolve their claim with Frampton, all to no avail, 
because Perkins insisted upon proceeding with their offset 
claim against Frampton. (Transcript, 5163. 1. 2-10) 
Yet, the court acknowledged that Frampton's counsel 
"put his time in" on the offset claims, which was over and 
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above the judgment of $4,557.00 in attorney fees for a bill 
of $426.00 seek unreasonable to the court. (Transcript 5165, 
1. 1-6). 
On the surface, Frampton would agree that it appears 
totally illogical for fees of $4,557.00 to be awarded to 
collect a judgment of $426.21. From the time the case was 
transferred to Third District Court, the whole time 
involvement and effort required to secure the original 
judgment and then to defend on the neglgigce offset claim 
has seemed unreasonable in light of the amount of recovery, 
yet absolutely necessary to successfully defend against 
possible adverse effects for the offset. Even this appeal 
appears unreasonable, yet Frampton has been charged with a 
bill larger than the amount of his original claim against 
Perkins, despite the fact he was victorious over Perkins. 
It is acknowledged that the trial court has wide 
discretion to determine what is a reasonable fee in any 
given circumstance; however, in this case the trial court 
did not award any attorney fees on Frampton's claim for 
offsets, because he felt the original $426.00 claim made 
awarding such a fee unreasonable. 
The Supreme Court in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 
(Utah, 1988) 764 P.2nd 985 at 990, sets forth certain 
11 
considerations the trial court should examine when 
determining whether a fee is reasonable: 
1. What legal work was actually performed? 
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably 
necessary to adequately prosecute the matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with 
the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar 
services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require 
consideration of additional factors, including those listed 
in the Code of Professional Responsibility? 
At the close of all Frampton's defense on offsets, 
Frampton filed a Motion for a Directed Verdict and/or a 
Motion to Dismiss, along with an accompanying Memorandum. 
At the same time, Frampton filed a Motion for Additional 
Attorney Fees on the offset claim, (Record, 1309-1311) along 
with an accompanying Memorandum, (Record, 1312-1319) and an 
Affidavit by David K. Smith, regarding attorney fees. 
(Record, 1320-1324) 
Because the Court was uncertain whether defense of 
an offset claim could be included in a claim for attorney 
fees on a mechanic's lien claim, and because the court was 
of the opinion that a previous award of $426.00 in damages 
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did not warrant additional attorney fees of over $9,000.00 
dollars, the court denied Frampton's motion. 
Nowhere, however, in the record, did the court 
attempt to go through any decisional making process to 
determine whether the requested fees of Frampton's attorney 
were "reasonable". The conclusion simply appeared to be 
that the original amount in controversy did not warrant any 
additional fees. 
The court in Dixie State Bank, supra, stated, 
however: 
"It is important to note that with this 
analysis (noted above) what an attorney bills or 
the number of hours spend on a case is not 
determinative. So, although the amount in 
controversy can be a factor in determining what 
a reasonable fee should be, the Court in Dixie 
State Bank, supra, stated that care should be 
taken in putting too much reliance on this 
factor. "It is a simple fact of life that it 
takes about the same amouint of time to collect 
a note in the amount of $1,000.00, as it takes 
to collect a note for $100,000.00" Id, at 990. 
Citing Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2nd at 624-25, the 
Dixie State Bank court went on to state: 
"The total amount of the attorneys fees awarded in 
this case cannot be said to be unreasonable just because it 
is greater than the amount recovered on the contract. The 
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amount of damages awarded in a case does not place a 
necessary limit on the amount of attorneys fees that can be 
awarded." Id. at 990. 
Factors which the courts have traditionally 
considered in determining whether a fee is reasonable 
include the following: 
1. The time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 
requisite to perform the legal services properly. 
2. The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that 
the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude 
other employment by the lawyer. 
3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for 
similar legal services. 
4. The amount involved and results obtained. 
5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by 
the circumstances. 
6. The nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client. 
7. The experience, reputation and ability of the 
lawyer or lawyers performing the services. 
8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
Cabrera, Ibid, at 624, note 2. 
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The trial court should make findings which explain 
the factors which they consider relevant in making the 
attorney fee award, especially when they reduce the amount 
from that requested. Hoth v. White, (Utah App., 1990), 700 
P.2nd 213 at 220 Here the court simply found the amount in 
controversy so small, that it considered any additional 
award of attorney fees to be unreasonable, and thus awarded 
no additional fees. The court in Hoth quoting from Regional 
Sales Agency, Inc., stated: 
"Where the evidence on reasonablness of 
requested attorney fees is both adequate and 
entirely undisputed, the court abuses its 
discretion in awarding less than the amount 
requested unless the factors described in Dixie 
State Bank11 (obtain).11 
In the case at bar, no objection was raised 
specifically to the time component of Frampton's fee, nor to 
the necessity of being present at trial. Since the adequacy 
of the fees was submitted by affidavit, it would be error 
for the court to have refused consideration of any fees 
whatsoever. 
The Utah Supreme Court has found that affidavits 
filed in some jurdisdictions which set forth the nature of 
the work performed and the number of hours spend in 
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prosecuting the claim to judgment or to the state for which 
the attorney fee is claim, to be consistent with the court's 
ability to make a determination of reasonableness of fees. 
Dixie State Bank, supra, at 990, note 8. Cottonwood Mall 
Co, v. Sine, (Utah, 1992), 830 P.2nd 266 at 268. 
POINT II: THE MECHANIC'S LIEN 
STATUTE IS INDEED BROAD ENOUGH TO 
PERMIT ATTORNEY FEES TO BE AWARDED 
IN DEFENDING AGAINST A TORT CLAIM 
FOR OFFSETS. 
It is well settled that a reasonable attorney's fee 
may be awarded under Utah Code Annotated, Section 38-1-18 
(1988), the applicable Mechanic's Lien Statutue, in an 
amount to be fixed by the court. Hoth v. White, (Utah App., 
1990), 799 P.2nd 213 at 219. 
The trial court was concerned whether or not 
attorney fees could be allowed under the mechanic's lien 
statute for defense of an offset. 
The statute itself provides: 
"In any action brought to enforce any 
lien under this chapter the successful party 
shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, which 
shall be taxed as costs in the action. (Section 
38-1-18, U.C.A., 1953) 
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The courts have determined that attorney fees 
awarded pursuant to this section are equitable in nature, 
and are governed by the rules of chancery practice. Frehner 
v. Morton, (Utah, 1967), 424 P.2nd 446 at 448. And since the 
Utah District Courts have jurisdiction both in equity and 
law matters, the District Court judges may determine the 
amount of fees to be awarded, and the decision of any jury 
would be advisory only. 
From the facts set forth above, Perkins chose to 
claim as an affirmative defense in its original answer to 
Frampton's claim to foreclose his mechanic's lien, a claim 
for negligent workmanship, seeking an offset. 
These pleading were never changed, nor when Perkins 
filed an Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, did she seek to change the nature of her action 
against Frampton. (Record, 572) 
The trial judge specifically ruled that the issue of 
negligent workmanship on Perkin's claim for offsets against 
Frampton would be reserved for trial, and that Frampton was 
barred from pursuing collection on its judgment until the 
issue of offsets could be resolved. Thus, to preserve its 
judgment, Frampton was obligated to appear at trial, and 
defend on the issue of negligent workmanship. 
Again, the case of Dixie State Bank, supra, is 
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instructive. In that case Dixie State Bank sought to 
foreclose a security instrument on a vehicle loan against 
the borrower, the Brackens, who failed to make monthly 
payments. The borrowers, the Brackens, filed a 
counterclaim alleging loss of "credit reputation" and sought 
punitive damages as well. Dixie State Bank was forced to 
prepare to meet the claims of the Brackens, though the 
Brackens dropped their counterclaim prior to the conclusion 
of trial. 
The court not only awarded attorney fees to Dixie 
State Bank under the contractual agreement between the 
parties which permitted recovery of attorney fees, but also 
awarded Dixie State Bank attorney fees under the Bracken's 
counterclaim sounding in tort for loss of credit reputation. 
There is no statute permitting Dixie State Bank to otherwise 
collect attorney fees for defending on a counterclaim 
sounding in tort. 
The Court stated: 
"First, while the bank's fee is large 
relative to the amount of its claim, it is small 
relative to the counterclaim interposed by the 
Brackens. The Brackens' litigation strategy 
converted the action from a routine collection 
action of a magnitude such that it might have 
been brought in circuit court into a brouhaha of 
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much larger proportions. 
Second, and more importantly, the fees 
incurred by the bank were increased several-fold 
over what they should have been by the tactics 
employed by the Brackens. It was the Brackens 
who raised unsuccessful motions before answering 
the complaint. It was the Brackens who asserted 
an unmeritorious counterclaim. It was the 
Brackens who got the first trial setting 
continued to take further depositions and obtain 
a jury trial. After the bank's counsel prepared 
accordingly, it was the Brackens who waived the 
jury they had earlier demanded. The attorney 
fees incurred by the bank were clarly much 
higher than they should have been in this case; 
but they were higher because of the inconsistent 
and unmeritorious positions taken by the 
Brackens-not because of any extravagance or 
'overkill' on the bank's part." Dixie State 
Bank, Ibid, at 991. 
And thus, the Court justified the awarding of 
attorney fees not only on the breach of contract, but also 
to defend against the Bracken's negligence counterclaim. 
In Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Ross, (Utah App., 
1993) 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 87, the court rules in a breach of 
contract case that the lanquage in the contract pertaining 
to the award of attorney fees, which provided that fees were 
recoverable in the pursuit and in the defense of an action, 
permitted an award of fees in defending a claim for 
recsission. And here, the mechanic's lien statute 
contemplates an award of attorney fees to the "successful 
party" and thus infers that one who successfully defends 
against a mechanic's lien claim (as by counterclaim or 
offset) whould be entitled to attorney fees. The logical 
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extension is that one who successfully defends against an 
offset or counterclaim in a lien foreclosure action would be 
entitled to reasonable attorney fees in those efforts as 
well. 
In the case at bar, the trial court made it 
abundantly clear that the court felt that Frampton's claim 
should never have been consolidated and brought from the 
Circuit Court to the District Court, and that the trial 
court attempted to get Perkins to resolve its counterclaim 
against Frampton, and felt further, that Perkins claim was 
without merit, all to no avail. It was not Frampton who 
blew the claim out of proportion, it was Perkins insistence 
on pursuing a meritless counterclaim. If Frampton's 
additional legal fees are viewed in light of the amount 
claim by Perkin's to be owing, then the fees are not 
disproportional. 
The trial court had at least by inference, suggested 
that Frampton's counsel "put in his time" in defending 
against Perkin's claim, suggesting that the fee request is 
not otherwise objectionable, excepting for the small 
recovery on Frampton's case in chief. While the trial court 
has broad discretion in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable fee, once the trial court makes a determination 
20 
in the exercise of its sound discretion that a fee is 
otherwise reasonable, it commits legal error if it awards 
less than a reasonable fee to the successful litigant. 
Dixie State Bank, Supra, at 991. 
In this case, if attorney fees incurred in the 
defense of an offset to a mechanic's lien claim may be 
legitimately claimed, then the court has a duty to determine 
what a reasonable fee is under the circumstances, and may 
not refuse to award any fees at all. 
If fees are allowed by law, they become a matter of 
legal right, and the trial court cannot refuse them; he can 
only determine their reasonableness. Cabrera v. Cottrell, 
(Utah , 1985), 694 P.2nd 622 at 625. 
POINT III: IT ATTORNEY FEES ARE AWARDED 
TO APPEALLANT IN THE LOWER COURT, THEN THE 
SUCCESSFUL APPELLANT IS ALSO ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL. 
Assume that this Court finds that Frampton is 
entitled to a determination of whether he is entitled to 
additional fees for defending against Perkin's offset. In 
such case, Frampton would be considered a prevailing party 
on appeal. Any party who is awarded attorney fees and costs 
at trial is also entitled to attorney fees and costs if he 
prevails on appeal. Living Scriptures, Inc. vs. Kudlik, 
21 
(Utah App., 1995), 258 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, at 13. See also, 
Wade v. Stangl, (Utah App., 1994) 869 P.2nd 9, at 13; Brown 
v^_ Richards, (Utah App., 1992) 840 P.2nd 143, at 156; Hoth 
v^ White, (Utah App., 1990), 799 P.2nd 213 at 221. 
Thus, Frampton should be entitled to an award of his 
costs and attorney fees in pursuing this appeal, to be added 
to the original judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should remand the issue of whether or not 
Frampton is entitled to additional attorney fees back to the 
trial court for consideration of the reasonableness of 
Framptonfs request. Certainly, the Utah Supreme Court has 
concluded that attorney fees may be awarded in the 
successful defense of a tort claim, where the underlying 
claim provides for payment of attorney fees. 
It is legal error not to provide for any attorney 
fees, where the court has acknowledged that essentially, the 
time spent by Framptonfs counsel in defending the tort claim 
was necessary. There is has been no evidence submitted to 
suggest that counsel for Frampton attempted to enhance the 
claim. 
22 
Attorney fees should also be ordered calculated for 
Frampton having to bring this matter on for appeal. 
DATED this ^ 0 ^ day of May, 1995. 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Kent L. Frampton 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true two true and 
correct copies each to the following Counsel this c50_ day 
of May, 1995, postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Darrell J. Bostwick 
Jeffery R. Price 
Walstad & Babcock 
Attorneys at Law 
254 West 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for First General Services 
Jesse C. Trentadue 
Claudia F. Berry 
Suitter, Axland and Hanson 
Attorneys at Law 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Attorneys for Zandra Perkins 
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Henry E. Heath 
Strong & Hanni 
Attorneys at Law 
Suite 600, Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Bear River Insurance 
Q .\.\L C— 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
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DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Utah State Bar No. 2993 
Attorney for Plaintiff r V) \& 
KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENTOffJ. ° ,rT 
FRAMPTON HEATING AND AIR CONDITIQNINS^TRJU 
Suite 600 TrtWVL^3^2r> 
6925 Union Park Center ,. ir/?'j 
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Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST GENERAL SERVICES, a 
Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
Defendant. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. C9&06000 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
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BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E. EUGENE PETERSON, FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES, ZANDRA L. 
PERKINS, and John Does I 
through XX, 
Defendants. 
KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT L. 
FRAMPTON HEATING AND AIR 
CONDITIONING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ZANDRA L. PERKINS, Trustee 
of the Zandra L. Perkins 
Family Trust, and FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES, 
Defendants. 
Consolidated 
Consolidated 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Plaintiff and 
Appellant, KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT L. FRAMPTON HEATING AND 
AIR CONDITIONING, by and through its counsel of record, DAVID 
K. SMITH, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the summary 
judgment of the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, entered in this 
matter on March 22, 1993. The appeal is taken from that 
portion of the summary judgment holding that Plaintiff, KENT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT L. FRAMPTON HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING 
SERVICES is not entitled to additional attorney fees from and 
against ZANDRA L. PERKINS for defending against ZANDRA L. 
PERKINS' claims of water damage as an offset to KENT L. 
FRAMPTON'S claim in foreclosure on its mechanic's lien. 
The appeal is taken from the Court's Order on Perkin's 
Motion for JNOV/New Trial and other post-trial motions issued 
by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, entered in this matter on 
September 3, 1993. 
The appeal is taken from those portion of the Order 
which: 
1. Grants Defendant Perkins' motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, which in part, reduce a judgment 
for additional attorney fees previously entered by the Court 
in favor of KENT L. FRAMPTON. 
2. Denies KENT L. FRAMPTON'S Motion to Amend its 
Judgment to supplement its attonrey fees award. 
*
8
 I DATED this (p day of October, 1993. 
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DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney at Law 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
KENT L. FRAMPTION, dba KENT L. 
FRAMPTION HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST GENERAL SERVICES 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
PERKINS, ZANDRA 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 900906000 CN 
DATE 08/05/93 
HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON 
COURT REPORTER ED MIDGLEY 
COURT CLERK DAG 
TYPE OF HEARING: HEARING 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. BOSTWICK, DARREL J 
D. ATTY. HEATH, HENRY E. 
ALSO PRESENT: ROBERT CAMPBELL, JON MARTINSEN, DAVID SMITH 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
COMES NOW ON REGULARLY BEOFRE THE COURT FOR HEARING, APPEARANCES 
AS SHOWN ABOVE. WHEREUPON, THE MOTION IS ARGUED TO THE COURT BY 
RESPECTIVE COUNSEL AND SUBMITTED. THE COURT NOW BEING FULLY 
ADVISED IN THE PREMISES, ORDERS SAID MOTION BE AND THE SAME IS 
HEREBY DENIED. THE OBJECTION TO THE FORM OF JUDGMENT REGARDING 
COSTS TO BE APORTIONED BETWEEN BEAR RIVER AND PERKINS. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES IS 
DENIED. DEFENDANT FRAMPTON'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES IS 
DENIED. ROBERT CAMPBELL TO PREPARE THE ORDER. 
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Tu-vJudicetDistnct 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Utah State Bar No. 2993 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT L. 
FRAMPTON HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING * 
Suite 600 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
APR 30 1993 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST GENERAL SERVICES, a 
Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
Defendant. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR AN ADDITIONAL 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
ON DEFENDING PERKINS' 
CLAIM FOR OFFSETS 
Civil No. C9006000 
Honorable Homer Wilkinson 
l j 
21 31 
41 
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BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E. EUGENE PETERSON, FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES, ZANDRA L. 
PERKINS, and John Does I 
through XX, 
Defendants. 
KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT L. 
FRAMPTON HEATING AND AIR 
CONDITIONING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ZANDRA L. PERKINS, Trustee 
of the Zandra L. Perkins 
Family Trust, and FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES, 
Defendants. 
Consolidated 
Consolidated 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT L. 
FRAMPTON HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING, and respectfully moves 
the Court for an additional award of attorney fees for having 
to Defend on ZANDRA L. PERKINS1 claim for offsets on KENT L. 
FRAMPTONrS mechanic's lien claim. 
DATED this"Bc^ day of April, 1993. 
1 
> 
2|| DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney at Law 
31 
4 I CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
5 I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and 
6 correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY 
7 FEES BY KENT L. FRAMPTON to Counsel for the various parties 
8 I this ^Q day of April, 1993, addressed as follows: 91 
1011 ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
JON C. MARTINSON 
11|| CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
12|| 2°1 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
131" 
' HENRY E. HEATH 
1411 H. BURT RINGWOOD 
STRONG & HANNI 
1511 Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
16f 
DARREL J. BOSTWICK 
1711 WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys at Law 
18|| 254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 19|| ^ u V ^ J ^ 20 | DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
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APR 3 0 1993 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Utah State Bar No. 2993 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT L. 
FRAMPTON HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING 
Suite 600 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST GENERAL SERVICES, a 
Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
Defendant. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, INC., 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K. SMITH 
IN SUPPORT OF CLAIM FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Civil No. C9006000 
Honorable Homer Wilkinson 
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Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E. EUGENE PETERSON, FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES, ZANDRA L. 
PERKINS, and John Does I 
through XX, 
Defendants. 
KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT L. 
FRAMPTON HEATING AND AIR 
CONDITIONING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ZANDRA L. PERKINS, Trustee 
of the Zandra L. Perkins 
Family Trust, and FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES, 
Defendants. 
Consolidated 
Consolidated 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
ss. 
) 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff's Counsel, for and on behalf 
of the Plaintiff, KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT L. FRAMPTON 
HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING, and states under oath as 
follows: 
1. That he is and has been counsel for the Plaintiff, 
KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT L. FRAMPTON HEATING AND AIR 
1 
2 
31 41 51 
61 
7 81 
91 
10 
111 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
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19 
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21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
281 
CONDITIONING, during the pendency of these proceedings. 
2. That he is a duly licensed attorney, and is 
licensed to practice law before the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah, and all inferior courts in the state, and has been so 
licensed since September, 1970. 
3. That his State Bar Number is 2993. 
4. That he primary practice of law is in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
5. That he is familiar with the usual and customary 
rates charged for legal services in actions presently being 
pursued by Kent L. Frampton in the above-captioned proceeding. 
6. That his usual and customary rate for legal 
services is $115.00 per hour. 
7. That the attached exhibit "A" represents a running 
account of time spent in preparation and trial of Defendant, 
Zandra L. Perkins, claim for offset against this Plaintiff on 
his mechanic's lien foreclosure. 
8. That the total costs and fees incurred in 
connection with defending on Perkin's claim for offset since 
the summary judgment was entered is $9,464.42. 
9. That said sum represents a reasonable attorney's 
fee in defense of Defendant's claim for offsets. 
DATED this £<j day of April, 1993. 
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.J DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
2II Attorney at Law 
3 SUSCRIBED and Sworn to before me this £?*'day of April, 
4 1993. 
CLAJ^ 5 My Commission Expires: K*£fa/.*i*—~' YY/ (J^IJ A^J£^-
NOTARY PUBLIC, Residing at 
6|| / W ^ / ^ i ^ .^ b~ /^f7 Salt Lake County, Utah 84047 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K^ SMITH IN SUPPORT OF 
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST DEFENSE OF OFFSET BY PERKINS 
to Counsel for the various parties this ^ ' day of April, 
1993, addressed as follows: 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
JON C. MARTINSON 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
jg|| One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
17 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
HENRY E. HEATH 
H. BURT RINGWOOD 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
2011 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DARREL J. BOSTWICK 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
2211 Attorneys at Law 
254 West 400 South, #200 
2311 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
i)tV 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ, 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
3/26/93 
3/31/93 
4/19/93 
4/20/93 
4/21/93 
4/22/93 
4/24/94 
4/25/93 
4/26/93 
4/27/93 
4/28/93 
4/29/93 
4/30/93 
Costs: 
7/27/93 
7/25/93 
7/25/93 
Appearance at hearing before Judge 
Homer Wilkinson on various motions in 
connection with preparation for trial, 
Prerparation of Notice to Submit for 
Decision on Objections to Attorney 
Fee Order. 
Preparation for trial and Trial Day 
Preparation for trial and Trial Day 
Preparation for trial and Trial Day 
Preparation for trial and Trial Day 
Research and preparation of Jury 
Instructions and Motion for Directed 
Verdict, with Memorandum. 
Research on Directed Verdict. 
Preparation for and Trial Day 
Preparation for and Trial Day 
Preparation for and Trial Day 
Preparation for and Trial Day 
Preparation of Directed Verdict, 
Attorney Fees Affidavit. 
TOTAL TIME TO DATE: 
Costs of transcript of Zandra Perkins 
Testimony on Direct. 
3.2 
1.0 
7.5 
6.8 
6.4 
7.6 
9.0 
2.0 
9.3 
10.0 
9.5 
8.0 
1.0 
81.3 
Photocopy Charges: 
Costs of Copy Card 
TOTAL COSTS: 
284 X $ 0 . 2 0 e a . 
$ 4 5 . 5 0 
$ 5 6 . 8 0 
$ 1 2 . 6 2 
$ 1 1 4 . 9 2 
5 
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DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Utah State Bar No. 2993 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT L. 
FRAMPTON HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING 
Suite 600 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
Oapaty < 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST GENERAL SERVICES, a 
Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
Defendant. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING FRAMPTON'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT 
Civil No. C9006000 
Honorable Homer Wilkinson 
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BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E. EUGENE PETERSON, FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES, ZANDRA L. 
PERKINS, and John Does I 
through XX, 
Defendants. 
KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT L. 
FRAMPTON HEATING AND AIR 
CONDITIONING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ZANDRA L. PERKINS, Trustee 
of the Zandra L. Perkins 
Family Trust, and FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES, 
Defendants. 
Consolidated 
Consolidated 
The Plaintiff, KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT L. FRAMPTON 
HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING, having, by and through his 
Counsel of Record, DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ., moved the above court 
for a Directed Verdict against ZANDRA L. PERKINS, Trustee of 
the Zandra L. Perkins Family Trust, on her claim for offsets 
at the conclusion of Perkins1 case in chief, and having 
renewed said motion at the conclusion of all testimony of all 
ni ^ nc 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
parties, and the Court having heard the arguments of Counsel 
for Frampton in favor of said motion, and the arguments of 
Perkins1 Counsel opposing said motion, 
And the court having read the Memorandum of the 
Plaintiff, Frampton, in support of said motion, and having 
considered all of the evidence presented at trial, 
And the Court being of the opinion that the Defendant, 
Perkins, has failed to demonstrate that the Plaintiff, 
Frampton, was the proximate cause of the Defendant's water 
damage, 
Does Now GRANT Plaintiff, Frampton's motion. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT 
L. FRAMPTON HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING'S motion for a 
Directed Verdict be and the same is hereby granted against the 
Defendant, ZANDRA PERKINS, Trustee of the Zandra L. Perkins 
Family Trust, on her claim for offsets allegedly due for water 
damage to her home in January, 1991. 
1
 'I DATED this 3 ^ day of April, 1993. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING FRAMPTON'S MOTION 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT to Counsel for the various parties this 
day of April, 1993, addressed as follows: 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
JON C. MARTINSON 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
HENRY E. HEATH 
H. BURT RINGWOOD 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DARREL J. BOSTWICK 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys at Law 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Utah State Bar No. 2993 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT 
L. FRAMPTON HEATING AND AIR 
CONDITIONING 
Suite 600 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST GENERAL SERVICES, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
Defendant. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual, 
Third Party-
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C900906000 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
1 
Third Party 
Defendant, ) 
BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E. EUGENE PETERSON, FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES, ZANDRA L. ] 
PERKINS, and JOHN DOES I 
thorugh XX, ] 
Defendants. ] 
KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba KENT ] 
L. FRAMPTON HEATING AND AIR 
CONDITIONING, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
ZANDRA L. PERKINS, TRUSTEE ] 
OF THE ZANDRA L. PERKINS 
FAMILY TRUST, and FIRST ] 
GENERAL SERVICES, 
Defendants. 
(Consolidated) 
i (Consolidated) 
The Plaintiff, KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba Kent L. Frampton 
Heatinq and Air Conditioning, having submitted his Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the Defendants, THE ZANDRA L. PERKINS 
FAMILY TRUST and FIRST GENERAL SERVICES, having submitted 
Memotand i jp ipposjt ion, and the Plaintiff having submitted 
2 
00887 
his Notice to Submit for Decision, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, 
1. The Plaintiff, KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba Kent L. 
Frampton Heating and Air Conditioning, is granted Summary 
Judgment against the Defendants, ZANDRA L. PERKINS FAMILY 
TRUST and FIRST GENERAL SERVICES. 
2. Plaintiff, KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba Kent L. Frampton 
Heating and Air Conditioning, is found to have performed work 
and provided materials on real property described in paragraph 
four below on or about July 26, 1990, having a reasonable 
value of $1,057.73, less a payment of $631.52 on 10/16/90, 
leaving a balance due of $426.21. He is further found to have 
filed a valid Mechanic's Lien in accordance with Section 38-1-
1, et seq., UCA, as revised and amended, and further is found 
to have properly given notice of the filing of said lien to 
the Defendant, Zandra L. Perkins, Trustee of the Zandra L. 
Perkins Family Trust, the owner of said premises, in 
accordance with Section 38-1-7, UCA. 
3. Said defendants, jointly and severally, owe the 
Plaintiff the sum of $426.21 together with interest thereon at 
the legal rate from and after 8/31/90, costs of filing the 
Mechanic's Lien, in the amount of $25.00, and Plaintiff's 
3 
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attorney fees in the amount of $4,557.00, together with such 
post-judgment attorney fees as the Plaintiff may incur in 
collecting the sums due the Plaintiff herein from the 
Def end ant; i1;.: „ 
4. Plaintiff's Mechanic's Lien, which was filed on 
September 26, 1990 as Entry Number 4970369 in Book 6255 at 
page 2 - -d to i e3 ate back and take effect as of July 
26, 1990, the date of the commencement of the work by Kent L. 
Frampton, dba Frampton Heating and Air Conditioning, and shall 
be treated as a lien against the following described parcel of 
real property: 
Property Address: 
5510 South 640 West 
Murray, Utah 84123-5613 
Property Description: 
All Of Lot 723, AUBURN GARDENS 
NO. 7, SUBDIVISION, according 
to the official plat thereof as 
recorded in the office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder, 
5. The Plaintiff shall be entitled to cause the 
Sheriff of Salt Lake County to sel 1 sa i d property at Sheriff's 
Sale to pa/y the amounts found herein to be due to the 
Plaintiff together with such additional costs and attorney 
fees as may be expended in connection with said sale. 
00869 
6. Should insufficient funds be obtained at Sheriff's 
Sale to cover the principal, interest, attorney fees and 
costs, Plaintiff shall be entitled to a deficiency judgment 
for the sums remaining owing to him, 
7. Defendant, ZANDRA L. PERKINS, TRUSTEE FOR THE 
ZANDRA L. PERKINS FAMILY TRUST, has sought in her answer to 
Plaintiff's Complaint, an Offset for negligent workmanship, 
and Plaintiff shall be stayed from pursuing his remedies until 
the claims of the Defendant are resolved at trial. 
DATED this is- day of January, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT to Counsel for the various 
parties this JJj_day of January, 1993, addressed as follows: 
n n s n n 
DARREL J. BOSTWICK, ESQ. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys at Law 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(Counsel for E. Eugene Peterson, dba First General Services) 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR., ESQ. 
JON C. MARTINSON, ESQ. 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth FJoor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(Counsel for Zandra L. Perkins) 
HENRY E. HEATH, ESQ. 
H. BURT RINGWOOD, ESQ. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys at Law 
Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
I (Joun.,,1.. I I...» bi.ii T,'IV<» Mutud.l. Insurance Company) 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
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DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Utah State Bar #2993 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
KENT L. FRAMPTON dba 
FRAMPTON HEATING AND AIR 
CONDITIONING 
Suite 600 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FRIST GENERAL SERVICES, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an individual,] 
Defendant. 
> MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
| Civil No. C9006000 
Honorable Homer Wilkinson 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, KENT FRAMPTON, dba 
FRAMPTION HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING SERVICE, and by and 
through his Counsel of Record, DAVID K. SMITH, respectfully 
moves for Summary Judgment against the Defendants, ZANDRA L. 
PERKINS, TRUSTEE OF THE ZANDRA L. PERKINS FAMILY TRUST, 
and/or FIRST GENERAL SERVICES, all pursuant to Rule 56, Utah 
1 
n n c n 
-.'LfS 
' " • ^
D , e r COURT 
to 2 9 33 AH '3Z 
JLERK 
Rules of Civil Procedure, as is more fully set forth in the 
accompanying Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, and 
the Affidavit of Kent Frampton in support thereof. 
DATED thus •^'W day of September, 1992. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
x
 hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment » the 
following counsel this ^^KJday of September, 1992: 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
MICHAEL T. ROBERTS 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
Attorneys at Law 
One Utah Center,Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841111 
HENRY E. HEATH, ESQ. 
H. BURT RINGW00D, ESQ. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys at Law 
Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Plange 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
KENT L. FRAMPTON 
Suite 600 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
oor 
DARRELL J. BOSTWICK, ESQ. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys at Law 
254 West 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
THOMAS M. MELTON, ESQ. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Attorneys at Law 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
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ROBERT H. WILDE, USB #3466 
KELLY DE HILL, USB #5086 
ROBERT H. WILDE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
935 East South Union Avenue, Suite D-102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 255-4774 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba 
KENT L. FRAMPTON HEATING 
AND AIR CONDITIONING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ZANDRA L. PERKINS, TRUSTEE 
OF THE ZANDRA L. PERKINS 
FAMILY TRUST, and FIRST 
GENERAL SERVICES, 
Defendant. 
ooOoo 
Defendant Perkins answers Plaintiff's Complaint as 
follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action upon which 
relief may be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
1. Defendant Perkins admits the allegations of 
Plaintiff's Complaint as set forth in paiagraphs 1, 2, 3, 
ANSWER 
Civil No.-01143005-3-
Judge LeRoy Griffiths 
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4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, and 16. 
2. Defendant Perkins denies the allegations of 
Plaintiff's Complaint as set forth in paragraphs 18. 
3. Defendant Perkins is without information to form 
a belief and therefore denies the allegations of 
paragraphs 6, 7, and 8. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
No claim may be brought for unjust enrichment where 
there exists an underlying contract. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate its damages. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
The claims asserted herein are the subject of an 
accord and satisfaction. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
The claims asserted herein are the subject of a 
release. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
The claims asserted herein have been paid. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's claims are barred by failure of 
consideration. 
00387 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's work was negligently performed resulting 
in damages which exceed the amount claimed herein. 
DATED this /f? day of August, 1991. 
RobertUH. Wilde 
Attorney for Defendants 
C0388 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Answer was mailed to the following via first 
class mail, postage prepaid thereon, this / k? day of 
August, 1991• 
David K. Smith 
6925 Union Park Center, #300 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
ire Ludlow T3-^ ^ v--^  
Secretary 
35-perkins.ans 
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DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Utah State Bar No. 2993 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
KENT L. FRAMPTON 
Suite 300 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
KENT L. FRAMPTON, dba 
KENT L. FRAMPTON HEATING 
AND AIR CONDITIONING ] 
Plaintiff ] 
vs. ] 
ZANDRA L. PERKINS, TRUSTEE ] 
OF THE ZANDRA L. PERKINS 
FAMILY TRUST, and FIRST ] 
GENERAL SERVICES, 
Defendants. 
C O M P L A I N T 
1
 civil *o.ty?)60 IP9'Z>% 
Honorable tti Gn'-ffi'+h^ 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, KENT L. FRAMPTON, and 
alleges as and for a cause of action against the Defendants, 
ZANDRA L. PERKINS, TRUSTEE OF THE ZANDRA L. PERKINS FAMILY 
TRUST and FIRST GENERAL SERVICES, jointly and severally, as 
follows: 
1. That the amount alleged due herein is less than 
1 
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$10,000.00, exclusive of court costs. 
2. That jurisdiction is granted this Court to hear 
this action on foreclosure of a Mechanic's Lien, pursuant to 
Section 78-4-7, Utah Code Annotated. 
3. That the Defendants herein at all times were and 
are residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and/or were 
and are doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. That at all times relevant herein the Plaintiff, 
KENT L. FRAMPTON, was and is a licensed heating and air 
conditioning contractor in the State of Utah. 
5. That on or about July 26, 1990 the Defendant, 
First General Services, employed the Plaintiff to provide 
materials, and perform labor for the purpose of remodeling 
and upgrading their home located at 5510 South 640 West, 
Murray, Utah 84123-5613, and more particularly described as 
All of Lot 723, AUBURN GARDENS NO. 7, Subdivision, 
purportedly owned by Zandra L. Perkins, Trustee of the 
Zandra L. Perkins Family Trust dated August 11, 1987. 
6. That the Plaintiff, agreed to perform the labor 
and provide the materials for the sum of $1,057.73. 
7. That the Plaintiff provided materials and 
performed labor on the Defendant's property for the purpose 
of making improvements thereon on July 26, 1987. 
2 
nmqi 
8. That there remains due the Plaintiff for said 
improvements the sum of $410.58 as of October 16, 1990. 
9. That the Plaintiff filed a Claim of Lien against 
the property pursuant to Section 38-1-1, UCA, et. seq., to 
secure payment of the sums yet due him on September 26, 1990 
as Entry No. 4970369, and furthermore, mailed a certified 
copy of said Claim of Lien to the Defendants within 30 days 
of the filing thereof. A copy of said Claim of Lien is 
attached and is made a part hereof by reference. 
10. Plaintiff is entitled to foreclose his lien as 
provided by statute, and to have the lien relate back to and 
take effect as of the date the first improvements were made 
on said property. 
11. Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable attorney's 
fee in foreclosing this lien. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
12. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained 
in paragraphs one through eleven above as if set forth at 
length herein. 
13. Plaintiff entered into a contract with the 
Defendant, First General Services of Salt Lake City, on July 
26, 1990. 
14. Plaintiff has fully performed under said 
3 
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contract. 
15. There is a balance owing on said contract to the 
Plaintiff in the sum of $451.33. 
16. Plaintiff has made demand thereon, all to no 
avail. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Defendant, First General Services of Salt Lake City, as set 
forth herein. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
17. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained 
in paragarphs one through eleven hereof as if set forth at 
length herein. 
18. Defendants have been unjustly enriched in the 
amount of $1,057.73, and there remains owning to the 
Plaintiff the sum of $410.58, together with interest from 
October 16, 1990. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Defendants as follows: 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
1. For a finding that the Defendants owe the 
Plaintiff the sum of $450.48, together with interest thereon 
at the legal rate from and after November 26, 1990 to the 
date of judgment herein. 
4 
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2. For the reasonable costs of filing said lien. 
3. For an Order foreclosing the mechanic's lien 
filed herein against the Plaintiff's property, and for an 
order authorizing the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Utah to 
sell said property or so much thereof as may be required to 
pay for the amounts due under said lien, including accrued 
interest, attorney fees, and costs incurred therein. 
4. Should there be a deficiency, then for a 
deficiency judgment against the Defendants for the amount 
thereof. 
5. For Costs of Court. 
6. For such other and further relief as to the 
Court may appear just and reasonable in the premises. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
1. For judgment against First General Services of 
Salt Lake City for breach of contract in the sum of $410.58, 
together with interest thereon at the legal rate from and 
after October 16, 1991, for costs of court and for such 
other and further relief as to the court appears just and 
reasonable in the premises. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
1. For judgment against the Defendants, jointly and 
severally, for unjust enrichment in the sum of $410.58, for 
5 
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interest thereon at the legal rate from and after October 
16, 1990, for costs of court and for such other and further 
relief as to the court appears just and reasonable in the 
premises• 
DATED this33^ day of July, 1991. 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 300 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
Plaintiff's Address: 
KENT L. FRAMPTON 
HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING 
8646 Alta Canyon Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
<? 
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IN THt UlSTRluT CuURT GF T 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
"HIRD JUDICIAL DIS 
uTArREDDISTRJCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
5 h I R S T bfc.Nfc.RAL SERVIUfc ib , A 
UTAH CDRPORATION _ 
FEB 1 0 1995 
' ' UepuyWiA 
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12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
PLAINTIF 
ZANDRA PERKINS, AN INDIVIDUAL, 
DEFENDANT. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, AN INDIVIDUAL, 
THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, A UTAH CORPORATION, 
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT„ 
ORIGINAL 
Efe£yEIIB^i„IBA!iliuRiPT__gF 
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 
VOL 8 OF 9 
CIVIL ND- C900906000 
HON- HOMER F„ WILKINSON 
17 BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE I9TH_DAY_0F 
IS APRIL
 A_ j.993, AND SUCCESSIVE DAYS CONTINUING,, THE ABO^E-
19 ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR TRIAL IN COURTROOM NO. 502 OF THE 
20 COURTS BUILDING, METROPOLITAN HALL OF JUSTICE, 240 EAST 400 
21 SOUTH, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, BEFORE THE HONORABLE HOMER F. 
22 WILKINSON, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF 
23 UTAH. 
24 BEEiABEiCiQii 
25 MIlSBii-DARREL^Ji 
BND^JEFFER^R^PR^ WALSTAD & BABCOCK, 254 
KNOW IF IT WAS OR WASN'T. 
BUT lAihICH EVER IT WAS, I DON'T "rHINK "rHERE ' S 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO KNOW WHAT TOOK PLACE THE-E< WHO DID OF 
DID NOT TURN I"!" ON, AND IF I"" WAS NOT ON WITH ALL THE PEOPLE 
IN AND OUT OF THERE, I THINK THE HOMEOWNER HAS ^ DUTY 
THEMSELVLS 1 
CONCERNED„ 
MR, CAMPBE 
HOMEOWNER DID,, YOUR HONOR 
MAKE THb CHLCK AS rAR AS HA f CGuLER 
ISN'T THAT EXACTLY WHAT THE 
MEAN YOU HAVE MARSHA SMITH-
THE COURTS NO—. 
MR. CAMPBELLS THE UNEQUIVOCAL TESTIMONY IS SHE 
[CALLED FRAMPTON, FRAMPTON DEMIES IT, AND THAT'S OBVIOUSLY A 
30NFLICT OF FAC1 
THE COURTS I DON'T THINK SHE WAS CALLING ON 
|HAT, SHE WAS CALLING CONCERNING THE LIEN. HER TESTIMONY, IF 
[f REMEMBER IT, IT WAS MENTIONED IN THERE. I DON'T THINK THE 
*CT THAT SHE ASKED IF THE WATER WAS HOOKED UP IS SUFFICIENT. 
4EY HAVE A DUTY TO GO DOWNSTAIRS IN THE BASEMENT AND LOOK AT 
|HAT AND MAKE THAT DETERMINATION 
*
f
' THAT MAN HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO COME IN AND 
fjSTALL THAT COOLER AND TO INSTALL IT PROPERLY, AND THERE'S 
€EN NOTHING SAID THAT HE DIDN'T, AND FOR HIM TO COME BACK 
ERE AND BE HELD, EVEN IF THE JURY—AND OF COURSE THEY WOULD, 
P I'VE THOUGHT ABOUT THIS, AND MAYBE I SHOULD SUBMIT IT TO 
*E JURY AND THEM SEE WHAT THEY SAY 
9 Q ? 
0 4 6 8 2 
BUT EVEN IF THE JURY CAME BACK WITH A VERDICT 
WITH THAT, I WOULD TAKE A JUDGMENT NOV,, "'HE^F IS JUST MCT ANV 
RESPONSIBILITY THERE TOWARD FRAMPTON. 
MR. CAMPBELLS MY CLIENT CALLS AND SAYS. 
"SHOULD WE WINTERIZE THIS? SHOULD WE SHUT OFF? WHERE DO WE 
TURN IT OFF?" 
THE COURTS I DON'T THINK SHE SAID THAT, EVEN 
IF SHE DID SAY THAT—, 
MR, CAMPBELLS ON THE SWAMP COOLER, AND HE 
SAYS—YOUR HONOR, HE SAYS IN RESPONSE, "IT'S NOT HOOKED UP, 
I'LL COME UP AND DO IT. THERE'S NO NEED TO TURN IT ON RIGHT 
NOW, OR TO UNHOOK IT, OR THAT THE WATER ISN'T FLOWING IN THIS 
SWAMP COOLER;; I'LL COME OUT NEXT SPRING AND DO IT." 
NOW THAT'S UNEQUIVOCAL TESTIMONY, I DON'T KNOW 
HOW WE COULD PUT IT BEFORE THE COURT ANY CLEARER THAN THAT. 
THE COURTS FIRST OF ALL—. 
MR. CAMPBELLS ON THE NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION. 
THE COURTs HER DEPOSITION, SHE SAID IT WAS 
MRS*; ON THE WITNESS STAND SHE WASN'T SURE. MRS* FRAMPTON 
SAYS THAT SHE HAD A CONVERSATION WITH HER, MR. FRAMPTON SAID 
HE DID NOT HAVE A CONVERSATION WITH HER. 
MR. CAMPBELLS RIGHT. SO IT'S IN CONFLICT. 
THE COURTS AMD EVEN IF HE DID, THEY WERE 
CALLING ABOUT THE LIEN ON THE PROPERTY, AND SHE ASKED ABOUT 
293 
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1 THE WATER COMING UP. I DON'T THINK THAT SHE CAN PASS OFF HE:< 
2 RESPONSIBILITY, HER DUTY, BY CALLING AND ASKING THAT, WHEN SHE 
3 COULD WALK DOWN TO THE BASEMENT AND CHECK THAT OUT, 
4 BECAUSE IF IT HAD BEEN INSTALLED PROPERLY, AND 
5 IT HADN'T—THE TUBE HADN'T BEEN, THEN SHE'D BE BACK SCREAMING 
6 AT HIM FOR NOT HOOKING IT UP. IT'S JUST AS A MATTER OF LAW 
7 I'M RULING THAT FRAMPTON HAS NO RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS MATTER, 
3 AND I'M DISMISSING THE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST FRAMPTON. 
9 MR, SMITHS THANK YOU, 
.0 MR. CAMPBELLS ALL RIGHT, YOUR HONOR. I 
12 THE COURT?, ANYTHING ELSE? MOW YOU'LL HAVE TO 
13 GET TOGETHER WITH THE CLERK—. 
14 MR. CAMPBELLS I THINK THE COURT RULED THAT WAY 
15 BECAUSE IT DIDN'T WANT TO HAVE AN EXTRA LAWYER ARGUING 
16 TOMORROW. (LAUGHTER) 
17 MR. SMITH; WE SAVED HALF AN HOUR. 
IS MR. HEATH; THAT'S WHY I JOINED IN THE MOTION. 
19 (LAUGHTER) 
20 THE COURT: WELL, THAT DOES PREVENT THAT* BUT 
21 THE COURT—I'VE STATED MY POSITION. ANYTHING AS FAR AS THE 
22 EXHIBITS? 
23 MR. HEATH: WE DO—I DON'T WANT TO TAKE THE 
24 COURT'S TIME. 
25 THE COURT: I'D RATHER NOT UNLESS YOU NEED ME 
294 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST GENERAL SERVICES, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an Individual, 
Defendant. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an Individual, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
REPORTERS TRANSCRIPT OF 
HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS 
OBJECTION TO FRAMPTON7S 
PROPOSED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C900906000 
(Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson) 
ORIGINAL 
ISTWCT COURT FILED D! 
Third Judicial District 
- * * = 
FEB 81995 
DepuiyOem 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 26th day of 
February, 1993, continuing in the 10:00 a.m. Law & Motion 
Calendar, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing in 
Courtroom No. 502 of the Courts Building, Metropolitan Hall 
of Justice, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, before 
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge in the Third Judicial 
District, State of Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
MESSRS. PARREL J. BOSTWICK, Attornev-at-Law: 
and JEFFERY R. PRICE, Attorney-at-Law. Walstad & Babcock, 
1 
MR. B0STWICK: Your Honor, you're ruling, then, 
based on the Mechanics Lien statute — yes, 38-1-17? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BOSTWICK: We have a different view of that 
statute, but we'll live by the Court's ruling, if I can 
proffer some information. 
First General Services was paid a portion, First 
General paid all of its subcontractors in relationship to the 
portion that it had received. 
In addition, Frampton's work was challenged, you'll 
recall, by Perkins. First General Services had no other 
choice but to claim some type of indemnity from Frampton, 
even though we had no real quarrel with the work that they 
did. 
When an owner withholds money against a general 
contractor, the general contractor is not the bank, Your 
Honor — . 
THE COURT: That's what I'm saying, if Perkins 
withheld monies, then I'm not going to assess attorney's fees 
against First General. If First General had that money, I 
would be assessing attorney's fees. 
MR. BOSTWICK: How would you like the 
information — I assume you would prefer counsel to work it 
out; if not, how would you like this presented to — . 
THE COURT: I guess you'd have to do it by 
6 
affidavit or maybe evidence would come out at the time of 
trial on the other matter. 
MR. SMITH: I would assume that's how it would 
happen, and resolve it at that time. 
MR. BOSTWICK: Perhaps we would reserve attorney's 
fees to trial. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings in the instant 
action came to a close.) 
I rwu uuuwcu umuivi 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST GENERAL SERVICES, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an Individual, 
Defendant. 
ZANDRA PERKINS, an Individual, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
REPORTERS TRANSCRIPT OF 
PERKINS/ JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT; OBJECTION TO 
FORM OF JUDGMENT RE: 
COSTS TO BE APPORTIONED 
BETWEEN BEAR RIVER AND 
PERKINS; PLAINTIFFS 
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT 
REGARDING ATTORNEYS FEES; 
DEFENDANT FRAMPTON'S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES 
Civil No. C900906000 
(Hon. Homer F. Wilkinson) 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the 5th day of 
August, 1993, commencing at the hour of 8:00 a.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing in Courtroom No. 
502 of the Courts Building, Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 
240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge in the Third Judicial 
District, State of Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
MESSRS. PARREL J. BOSTWICK. Attornev-at-Law; 
and JEFFERY R. PRICE. Attorney-at-Lav. Walstad & Babcock, 
y-<J x ~ C 
1 evidence for reasonable minds to differ, and the jury defined 
2 the verdict which they did. 
3 However, except as to the area of attorneys fees: 
4 1 I asked Mr. Campbell the question, "If I arbitrarily set the 
5 attorneys fees, whether it would stand, would I have the 
6 authority?" He says, "No." 
7 I certainly question it. But I don't know how else 
8 to approach the situation. 
9 Mr. Campbell argues that there should be an 
10 apportionment, and his argument may be good. I'm not 
11 persuaded by it. If it were just the — there were two areas 
12 of attorneys fees, the mechanic's lien, if it were just for 
13 that area, for the foreclosure of the mechanic's lien, I 
14 would say, yes. 
15 But with the provision of the contract for 
16 attorneys fees, and by statute that becomes reciprocal, then 
17 I think the issues is raised relating very directly to that 
18 contract. 
19 And I may be wrong, and I may find out, and I 
20 certainly will be the first to acknowledge if I have made a 
21 mistake. 
22 But I'm not persuaded. But yet I'm looking for a 
23 way to adjust the attorneys fees. 
24 I just cannot allow attorneys fees of $52,000 to be 
25 awarded on a $10,000 claim. I cannot. And I will address 
05162
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that right now, to Mr. Smith. 
I tried my best, my best to get Mr. Smith out of 
this case. I looked at it and I didn't find it in pretrial 
and before that they had — that anybody had any cause of 
action against Mr. Smith. Fine, if they did, but they left 
him in. 
And of course, the expenses ran up on it. And I'm 
still of the opinion that he had no business being in it. 
You know that, because I sustained his motion for a directed 
verdict as soon as it was made. 
But yet, I'm also of the opinion that the 
Mechanic's Lien Statute on the attorneys fees is not broad 
enough to cover the alleged water damage that was caused by 
your client as far as the property was concerned. 
And even if the statute is that broad, I cannot 
award attorneys fees of $13,000, in the neighborhood of 
$13,000, on a $426 claim. That's what I'm saying: I shook 
my head and asked, "Where's this case going? What are they 
doing? Why can't we get some reasonableness in these 
attorneys fees? They're just not reasonable." 
I don't know. I'm still thinking, and I guess I'm 
going to do something that I think is subject to being 
overruled. But I guess this case is going up. I wish I 
could do something to end it, make everybody happy, but I 
don't have those magic powers. 
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EXAM BY CAMPBELL 
1 Q AND THE TOTAL? 
2 A YES, IT IS. 
3 Q $13,674.65? 
4 A I BELIEVE THAT'S 574, BUT THAT'S CLOSE. 
5 MR. CAMPBELL: YOUR HONOR. WE OFFER EXHIBIT 60 
6 IN CONNECTION WITH THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS, AND IT RUNS 
7 TO THE FRAMPTON CLAIM BY MS. PERKINS ON THE OFFSET ISSUE. 
8 THE COURT: ANY OBJECTION, COUNSEL? 
9 MR. SMITH: NO. 
10 THE COURT: EXHIBIT NO. 60 IS ADMITTED. 
11 Q WHAT HAPPENED? DID USF&G PAY FOR THE COST OF THE 
12 REPAIR OF THE FLOOD DAMAGE? 
13 A YES, THEY DID. 
14 Q WHAT ELSE HAPPENED WITH USF&G? 
15 A THEY CANCELED MY POLICY. 
16 Q WHEN? 
17 A IT WOULD HAVE BEEN—I DON'T RECALL THE DATE; I 
18 BELIEVE IT WAS THE FOLLOWING MONTH OR SO, RATHER QUICKLY. 
19 Q WERE YOU ABLE TO GET INSURANCE ANYWHERE ELSE? 
20 A YES. 
21 Q WHEN? 
22 A AS SOON AS THIS POLICY WAS TERMINATED, ANOTHER ONE 
23 WAS PUT IN PLACE. 
24 Q WHAT DAMAGES DID YOU SUSTAIN AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE 
25 SWAMP COOLER INCIDENT IN ADDITION TO THE COSTS SHOWN ON 
9 
